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History of Science for Its Own Sake? 
 
Steve Fuller 
 
I see two major themes arising from Mark Erickson’s (2010) provocative question, ‘Why 
should I read histories of science?’ The first pertains to the apparent failure of historians to 
address ‘why’ the history has taken the course it has. Although Erickson singles out histories 
written by professional scientists, it is a question that is also fairly asked of professional 
historians, who remain sufficiently turned against positivism to prefer micro-
contextualisations of the past. The second theme concerns the audience for histories of 
science. Here I am much less happy than Erickson with Shapin’s (2005) characterisation of 
how historical writing about science would need to change in order to acquire a wider 
audience. 
 
Even the most retrograde internalist account has a very clear sense of the line of causation 
that runs through the history of science, since the history itself unfolds a logic of increasing 
epistemic progress. This logic accounts for which details are included and excluded from the 
narrative that is presented as one insight building upon previous ones, all illuminating some 
domain of reality that is always coming clearer into view. Thus, one talks about only that 
which is essential to realizing the overall telos. In this respect, Agassi’s (1963) term 
‘inductivist’ is a bit deceptive because the term is really being used as a synonym for 
‘incremental’ (as opposed to ‘revolutionary’) change, but not in its strict logical sense as the 
opposite of ‘deductivist’. In fact, Agassi’s so-called inductivist historians of science are in 
fact very deductivist insofar as they believe that there are foundational universal premises of 
theory and method that underwrite the entire scientific enterprise, and which the history 
comes gradually to discover. The history of science is a collective learning exercise by which 
humanity understands the nature of reality. Thus, the great positivist pioneers of the history of 
science discipline – both practising scientists like Ernst Mach and practising historians like 
George Sarton – made a point of addressing both colleagues and the general public in their 
historical works. 
 
This whole way of thinking about the history of science, which owes more than a small debt 
to German idealism, was raised to a notoriously ironic level of self-consciousness in Imre 
Lakatos’ historiography of science as ‘rational reconstruction’, according to which the actual 
historical details that deviate from the logical step-wise narrative are consigned to the 
footnotes (Lakatos 1978: chap. 2). This meant that often the footnotes were very lengthy and 
argumentative, as scientists whose word was gospel for many decades in their fields got 
portrayed as ignoramuses-in-the-making. Much of the moral fervour that informed the 
empiricist backlash of both naturalistic philosophers (e.g. Larry Laudan) and constructivist 
sociologists (e.g. David Bloor) of science starting in the late 1970s was fuelled by the 
perception that the Lakatosian vision was propelled by a science-worshipping philosophical 
arrogance that betrayed a casual disregard for the facts. At least, this appeared to be the mood 
of the history and philosophy of science departments where I was a graduate student in the 
early 1980s. A precedent for Lakatos -- and the contempt that his project generated -- might 
be theological defences of the divine right of kings based on Biblically ‘rationalised’ 
histories, outrage at which helped spark the 17
th
 century wars of religion in Europe.  
 
However, with the coolness afforded by historical distance, I would argue that there is merit 
to what Lakatos was trying to do. Whatever his other faults, Lakatos – or the positivists who 
came before him – could not be accused of lacking a clear sense of the object of scientific 
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inquiry. If nothing else, ‘progress’ presupposes a determinate origin and aim. To be sure, the 
identities of both ends of the process may be contested but that there are the two ends is not 
contested. If one takes such a view of the history of science seriously, then its facts come to 
be weighed in a particular way. Erickson observes that John Gribbin (2002), whom I take to 
be a vulgar positivist, makes several factual errors in his physics-led general history of 
science. While one might regret such errors and hope they are corrected in subsequent 
editions of the work, their epistemic significance needs to be measured by how much they 
impede the narrative logic that Gribbin wishes to advance. Assuming that Gribbin’s view of 
the actual history of science is like Lakatos’, such errors of fact may count as little more than 
typographical errors. In both cases they simply pertain to contingent features of the historical 
narrative that could have gone one way or another at a particular moment without affecting 
the truth of the overall trajectory.  
 
But notice that to make this sort of judgement, one needs to have a reasonably clear sense of 
where the trajectory of science is heading – at least clear enough to distinguish what has been 
contingent and necessary to its development. While today’s readers may regard this as an 
impossibly high epistemic standard, if it is not met, does the ‘history of science’ retain any 
proper meaning at all?  To be sure, it is possible to do a history of the word ‘science’ and its 
various cognates. But given the word’s clear normative import, that project would amount to 
tracking the descendants of Plato’s interest in knowledge for statecraft (Fuller 1988: chap. 7). 
It would thus follow the history of politics a bit more closely than most professional scientists 
and historians of science would find comfortable, since much of what both groups want to 
talk about as ‘science’ originated in the margins of power and only fitfully made their way to 
the centres of epistemic authority. Of course, much of this discussion is obviated, as Erickson 
rightly points out, because at least professional historians have come to accept that social 
context is integral to understanding the history of science. But that now widely agreed 
practise threatens to turn the ‘history of science’ into a history of everything as seen through 
science, the comic potential of which Bill Bryson’s (2004) best-selling book has already 
realized. 
 
For at least the past quarter century, professional historians of science of my generation have 
found a diplomatic solution to the problem raised here. They have simply evacuated the 
concept of science of any univocal meaning. Their modus operandi is traceable to Foucault’s 
(1970) archaeology of knowledge. In Foucault’s wake, historians have acquired a sense of 
‘objectivity’ that involves treating everything as remnants of societies long past to which they 
themselves do not belong. The historiographical significance of the object in this context is 
that, above all, an object is something that has clear boundaries – both spatial and temporal. 
Foucault himself turned this point to great effect in writing about ‘man’ as an object on the 
intellectual horizon that was formally launched at the end of the 18
th
 century but was 
gradually disappearing at the end of the 20
th
 century.  
 
In a similar vein, while one might admire Peter Galison (1997) for his ability to write about 
the theory-experiment relationship with an attention to technical detail that merits praise from 
professional physicists, in the end he is discussing these matters as the outcomes of practises 
surrounding particular artefacts through which ‘trading zones’ have been managed for the 
transaction of information. It is as if Galison first dug up the original Monte Carlo simulators 
from the ground and then endeavoured to find a sympathetic interpretation of their purpose. 
Such a modus operandi is very much in the spirit of someone detached from any larger vision 
that might have been shared by the scientists directly involved in the enterprise. In fact, it 
might be seen as an exercise in giving those scientists a decent burial – that is, demonstrating 
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respect for their project in terms they would have appreciated, while at the same admitting 
that the limit of their activities has been reached. 
 
The ‘new objectivism’ that characterises so much of professional history of science today 
(e.g. Daston and Galison 2007) is arguably a half-hearted response to the breakdown of the 
modernist metanarrative. Because they largely accept the postmodernist premise that 
scientific progress is a failed myth, historians nowadays feel no obligation to participate in its 
perpetuation, and hence are no longer compelled to issue clear judgements about what does 
and does not matter to the advancement of science. This removes any need for the historian to 
have a recognisable personality that is ideologically invested in the metanarrative’s outcome. 
Such a ‘de-subjectivisation’ of history is a potential impediment to directly addressing a 
broad audience. Here it is worth recalling that despite the difficulty, if not outright 
unreadability, of his works, Stephen Hawking’s unique selling point as a popular science 
writer has been his ability to recount the history of physics as culminating in his own ongoing 
research. The persuasiveness of this subjective appeal, present to varying degrees in positivist 
popular histories, should never be underestimated. In its absence, history can easily dissolve 
into a mass of details, each of equal significance, but lacking any overall direction.  
 
The solution to this problem sought by today’s new objectivists is reminiscent of those 
Romantics and Victorians who turned to aestheticism (‘art for art’s sake’) in the 19th century 
to channel their residual religious sentiment in an increasingly secular world. The difference, 
of course, is that the sentiment now derives from a scientific source, typically physics. But in 
both cases, one focuses on particular objects as if they were ends in themselves – that is, not 
serving any larger purpose. The objects are presented as the culmination of various 
converging processes rather than as transitional stages through which these processes are 
working in order to achieve something greater in the future. Thus, Leonardo’s The Last 
Supper or the Monte Carlo simulator might be presented as a site of multiple influences that 
are delicately negotiated in terms of the object’s construction. This captures the iconographic 
standpoint favoured by the aesthete who has no instrumental interest in the object, which by 
definition has already done all that it could do. However, those who see the object as a 
moment in a living enterprise would want to make judgements about what is worth 
preserving, removing and enhancing in future versions. Such is the standpoint of people 
actively engaged in the project that produced the object. It is how both artists and scientists 
tend to treat their own past. They personalise their interactions with the object, so that its 
value is carried over in their own activity and its products.  
 
For what it is worth, aestheticism can be credited with demonstrating that subjective 
involvement is not the only way to make an extraordinary human activity appear valuable. 
And just as one can appreciate art without being an artist, one can appreciate science without 
being a scientist. The latter is certainly implicit in the new objectivism and comes out clearly 
in Erickson’s quote from Shapin (2005). In both cases, the process is cast as highbrow 
entertainment: a self-consuming activity aimed at a self-contained object. In this respect, 
Shapin’s ‘cocktail party’ standard of historiographical relevance might be seen as a latter-day 
version of Aristotle’s principles of good theatre. However, someone more cynical than I 
might observe that such entertainment functions as a disincentive to follow in the footsteps of 
the original artists and scientists whose work is depicted, except in the manner of a wake.  
 
In any case, it would be a mistake to conclude that aestheticism is the only, let alone the best, 
route for popular science written by those not active in science’s own front lines. In fact, the 
dominant mode of popular science writing in the first half of the 20
th
 century was a kind of 
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advocacy journalism that leveraged contemporary developments into visions of future 
utopias. Exemplary works in this vein were penned by HG Wells and JG Crowther in Britain, 
as well as by the first dedicated science columnist in a US newspaper, Waldemar Kaempffert 
of The New York Times. Spiritual descendants of these figures are conspicuous by their 
absence today, their numbers already beginning to decline once we entered the ‘Atomic Age’. 
However, the reason for this decline is hardly mysterious. Between them, the three figures I 
mentioned gave ideological forward momentum to much of what turned out to be the most 
destructive and authoritarian tendencies in the century’s history, including Fascism and 
Communism. So, while I would personally welcome a revival of a more utopian and 
futuristic approach to popular science as an antidote to the aestheticism favoured by today’s 
historians of science, aestheticism does enjoy the virtue of being harmless.  
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